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ABSTRACT
Many o f China's large state owned en terp rises
(SOEs)
are widely recognised
as
being
inefficient, lo ss m aking and a m ajor drain upon
th e country's reso u rces. For the su stained
progress o f the country towards th a t of a
m arket econom y, fu rther em phasis will need to
be placed upon th e reform of su ch en terp rises.
W hile step s have already b een ta k en in th is
direction, su ch a s th e m ovem ent tow ards th e
corporatisation o f su ch enterp rises and the
selling o f sh a re s in selected en terp rises, a
logical n ext step is to move in the direction o f
privatisation to fu rther enhance th eir econom ic
perform ance.
T he
experiences
of
other
tran sition econom ies could be relevant in
identifying w hat are th e m ajor options and
o b stacles in th is regard, and w hich, if any,
p o ssess m ost applicability in the context of China.
T he paper reviews th e recen t perform ance of
C hina's SO E s, identifies the reform s w hich have
already b een im plem ented in th is area, outlines
th e experiences o f other transition econom ies in
regard to th e re-stru ctu ring of th eir S O E s, and
p laces em phasis upon th ose options w hich are
likely to be m ost applicable to th e C hinese
situation.

This paper was presented at the International Conference on The Economies o f
Greater China, 7-8 July 1997, The University of Western Australia, Perth,
Australia.

1. INTRODUCTION
The legacy of central planning for China is the existence of unique
economic problems in comparison to that of other rapidly
developing economies in East Asia. In particular, two pressing
and related problems have still to be overcome. Firstly a financial
system which is not yet run on market lines, preventing the
development of indirect policy instruments essential for
macroeconomic control in the context of a market economy.
Secondly, and the focus of this paper, the existence of a large
number of state owned enterprises (SOEs), many of which being
loss making. China has more than 100,000 state run companies,
employing approximately two thirds of the urban workforce. It is
widely believed that more than half of these state sector firms are
currently making losses and that this proportion is rising.
Government concerns about creating mass unemployment in the
cities and major social unrest, has resulted in large SOEs being
heavily subsidised as well as being able to gain access to soft
credit. As a result the state banks, despite measures taken in
1994 to encourage them to lend on commercial lines and the
creation of three development banks exclusively responsible for
policy lending1 from 1995, were, in reality, under pressure to keep
extending credit to large state firms and on favourable terms2. The
result of this is an accumulation by the banks of unpaid debts
which is undermining the financial system. Although the Chinese
may save a great deal, a significant proportion of this is not being
used in an optimum way. With few alternative ways of saving
open to them, most Chinese save with the state banks.
Approximately 70% of bank loans to industry still go to the state
1 The State Development Bank of China, the Export-Import Bank, and the
Agricultural Development Bank of China.
2 At a negative real interest rate.
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sector, which produces less than a third of industrial output,
while the dynamic non state sector, producing the remaining two
thirds of industrial output, finds access to such loans more
difficult and the terms less favourable. The pressure on the
government to continually provide more credit to state run firms
also means that China remains vulnerable to bouts of inflation.
The inflationary pressure arising in 1992/93 led to a renewed
phase of macroeconomic austerity, from July 1993, with the
introduction of a 16 point austerity program announced by the
Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, to restore order to the economy. This
involved pursuing deflationary policies largely through controls on
state investment via credit rationing and administered price
controls, to lower economic growth and so reverse the rapid
increase in prices. However this contributed to the SOEs facing
tight credit, substantial losses and indebtedness, both to the
banks and to each other (the triangular debt problem). By 1996,
after almost three years of austerity, the SOEs were in a further
weakened position, with unexpectedly large losses culminating in
considerable state funding and extension of credit to the large
SOEs by the state banks. During the first six months of 1996, for
every dollar China's industrial enterprises made in profit only one
cent came from state enterprises. The lack of an apparent hard
budget constraint has contributed to this relatively poor
performance, with managers being unconcerned at rising losses
and the cost of scarce credit. The further growth in the
indebtedness of the state enterprise sector is proving to be of
considerable concern. Estimates have been made that the
accumulated loans made by the state bank sector to loss making
state owned industrial enterprises, as at the end of 1995, could be
as much as the equivalent of 10% of GDP or even more. Some
state banks have poorly performing loans equivalent to 25% or
more than the value of their assets. While the level of
indebtedness seems now to be stabilising, the situation is forcing
2

the restructuring of the state enterprise sector. A major challenge
facing China during the remainder of the 1990s will be the need to
accelerate the movement towards restructuring of SOEs, while
minimising its impact upon unemployment.
The optimism about SOE reform and restructuring from a new
phase of reform begun in 1993 has now been questioned, given
this recent expansion of subsidies and credit to the SOE sector.
However a number of ad hoc measures are being implemented to
tackle the problem of the poorly performing SOEs. These include
corporatisation and commercialisation of the large scale
enterprises, and the auctioning, leasing and merging of small and
medium sized enterprises. In particular, through gradual
corporatisation of the large SOEs the Chinese authorities plan to
separate government administration from enterprise management.
Based upon the recently enacted Company Law of 1994, the
rights of enterprises were to be safeguarded while the
responsibility of the state was to be limited. However the
principle of state ownership is to be maintained. A key element of
state enterprise reform will also involve divesting from them the
provision of subsidised housing, social security, health care and
other social benefits.
Complicating the SOE dilemma for the Chinese authorities are
two other mounting pressures, one from inside China and the
other from outside. Inside pressure in the form of growing income
disparities between social strata and geographical regions
threatens to fuel social unrest. Many of the loss making
government enterprises are in the poor provincial areas, where
there closure would only exacerbate the existing income disparity.
At the same time, China is experiencing outside pressure as its
trading partners demand greater access to its markets as the price
for its long delayed entry into the WTO. The increased
competition generated could prove to be fatal for many
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inefficient, capital and technology short SOEs, and even some of
the profitable ones.
On the positive side the non state sector is growing very
rapidly, resulting in the SOEs share of industrial production and
employment having fallen steadily. Some forecasters suggest that
the number employed by state industries fell by 10 million in the
last year alone.3 The growth of private firms along with the quasi
private township and village enterprises (TVEs) may mean that
the withering of the state sector can be managed smoothly. This in
turn should allow more resources to be gradually shifted to the
non state sector, thereby increasing China's further potential for
growth.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 a
review of developments in the industrial sector and the recent
performance of the SOEs is conducted. Section 3 identifies the
major reform measures which have been advanced to improve the
performance of the SOEs. Section 4 briefly identifies other SOE
reform related measures in the areas of employment, social
security and housing. Section 5 conducts a review of the
privatisation experience and measures taken in other transition
economies in regard to their SOEs, and identifies their potential
applicability to China. Finally section 6 presents a summary of
the major conclusions to be derived from this paper.
2. INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AND SO E PERFORMANCE

The economic progress of the Chinese economy has been truly
remarkable. Since reform began in 1978 the economy had
quadrupled in size by 1995, and is expected to increase by a
further 50% by the end of the decade. The major engine for this
growth is to be found from the extensive investment in the
industrial sector, and the opening up of the economy to
international trade and investment. However despite this
4

stunning and sustained economic success for China as a whole, a
number of unresolved legacies remain to be overcome from the
country's "growing out of the plan"3. Two crucial and inter
related problems have arisen from this process and are in urgent
need of attention by the authorities. Firstly there is the need to
put the financial sector on a commercial footing and to develop
indirect policy instruments, such as that of the interest rate, as a
means of conducting macroeconomic control within the context of
a market oriented economy. Secondly, as with other reforming
socialist economies such as India and Vietnam, there is a pressing
need to restructure the country's SOEs. Although the relative size
of the SOE sector in the Chinese economy has declined sharply
since the onset of reforms in the late 1980s, it still remains
important in the economy. In 1978, about 78% of the gross value
of industrial output was accounted for by SOEs, declining
significantly to around 31% by 1995 ( see Table 1). Despite this
the SOE sector's contribution to total output remains large, and it
employs about two-thirds of China's 170 million strong urban
workforce (Figure 1). In addition, the SOE sector is closely linked
to the banking system through the credit plan, pre-empting over
two thirds of total domestic credit4. It also remains important in
budgetary operations, contributing directly to about one fourth of
total revenue and receiving operating subsidies amounting to two
thirds of the overall budget deficit.
The overall financial performance of the SOE sector, however,
remains weak. Although the gross profits of SOEs rebounded
markedly in 1992-93 with the strong performance of the economy,
the losses of some SOEs have continued at a very high level. A
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This description of China’s development has been taken from Naughton
(1996)
This figure has been put as high as 80-90% by other sources.
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Table 1
Industrial Production by Ownership of Enterprises (%)
1978

1989

1995

S ta te

78.0

56.1

30.7

C o llectiv e

22.0

35.7

43.2

P riv ate / Ind ivid u al

0

4.8

12.5

Joint Venture/Foreign

0

3.4

13.6

Source: China Statistical Publishing House

Figure 1
Com position of China's Employment

Million
600 t
500

-

400

"

300

"

□

Other Rural

■

TVEs

□

■

■

'

Other Urban
Urban State Sector

■

1993
1986
1978
Source: China Statistical Publishing House 1995
6

sectoral disaggregation of losses during the early 1990s suggests
that they were about equally distributed among the industrial,
foreign trade and commerce, and grain sectors. In the industrial
sector, about one half of the losses were concentrated in the coal
and oil industries alone. Following the adoption of new
accounting standards in early 1994, it was estimated that about
one half of all SOEs were incurring losses. Even on official figures,
the percentage of enterprises which lose money rose from 27% in
1990 to 43% in 1995, and, for the first time ever, the state sector
as a whole swung into a small loss during the first three months of
1996 and this did not include the subsidies provided by
government. In the past SOE losses have been covered about
equally through budgetary subsidies and bank loans, with the
latter having a consequentially detrimental effect upon the
portfolio quality and capital structure of the state banking
system.
The loss making SOEs therefore represent a sizeable drain
upon government revenue and domestic saving, and present a
significant obstacle to the future reform and health of the
economy. For example the World Bank estimated that China
subsidised its SOEs to the tune of US$14.4 billion in 1993,
against a US$7-8 billion budget deficit that year. The more recent
performance of the SOEs indicates that this deterioration is
continuing, suggesting an urgent need for attention by the
authorities, and that China's state sector is in worse shape now
than at any time in its 18 years of economic reform. The weakness
of the state sector has been further compounded by the austerity
program in effect since July 1993 arising from the break neck
growth of output in 1992 and 1993, initiated by Deng Xiaoping's
famous visit to the coastal provinces in early 1992, and the
consequential build up of inflation within the economy (see Table
2). The austerity measures involved controls on state investment
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Table 2
GDP Growth and Inflation 1990-97
GDP Growth (%)

RPI (%)

1990

3.8

2.1

1991

9.3

2.9

1992

14.2

5.4

1993

13.5

13.2

1994

11.8

21.7

1995

10.2

14.8

1996

9.7

6.0

1997

10.5e

8.5e

e Estimates
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
Figure 2

Jun

Industrial Sales as % of Output January 1995-July 1996

Source: J.P. Morgan
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via credit rationing and administered price controls. By 1996 a
soft landing had been achieved, with inflation less than GDP
growth for the first time since 1993. Charing the austerity period,
however, sluggish domestic demand, low levels of new investment
and a slump in exports hit Chinese companies hard. One sign of
this pain has been the falling ratio of industrial sales to output, a
proxy for gauging stock levels (see Figure 2). A falling ratio
implies that stocks of goods are accumulating. The problem was
made worse by the state owned firms that maintained production
and employment while accumulating losses or experiencing
reduced profits. The SOEs were able to do this despite tight
credit policies, because the country's state owned commercial
banks were called upon to increase fixed investment loans to large
state enterprises. By, for example, an inflation adjusted 18% in
1995. The more dynamic non state sector, meanwhile, found its
access to credit increasingly more difficult with its share of
commercial bank loans plunging by a real 28% in 1995. Hence
despite the austerity measures, credit remained plentiful for the
economy's least efficient sector. The government is anticipating
channelling a further 71.5% of fixed asset investment, US$305
billion, into state enterprises in 1997. This has led many
economists to question the Chinese authorities' willingness to
reform the SOEs and to wean them off subsidies and easy credit.
For some time China has tried to simply grow out of the SOE
problem, by letting overall GDP expansion, and a relatively faster
growth rate of the nonstate sector, reduce the size of the state
sector (see Table 3). From 78% in 1978 the contribution of China's
118,000 SOEs has shrunk rapidly, accounting for under a third of
industrial output by 1995. Picking up the slack is the non state
sector which is increasingly absorbing the roughly 15% of the
urban work force which the government concedes is superfluous.
Playing a leading role in the nonstate sector is that of the
collective enterprises, consisting of both urban and rural
9

enterprises. The collective sector has seen its share of industrial
output increase from 22% in 1978 to 43% in 1995. There has been
a particularly impressive growth of the rural enterprises, the so
called TVEs. In 1978 some 1.52 million TVEs employed 28.3
million workers, which expanded dramatically to 25 million TVEs
employing 120 million workers by 1994. Unlike the SOEs they are:
small in size, averaging about 5 workers each; sufficiently nimble
enough to respond to market changes in a way which the SOEs
cannot; and are subject to hard budget constraints. Despite
ambiguous property rights, they have been a remarkable and
somewhat unanticipated successful consequence of China's
economic reforms. Table 4 indicates that the productivity
performance of the collective sector, and most notably the TVEs,
has been noticeably superior to that of the state sector. In
addition many thousands of private companies, both domestic
and foreign owned, and joint ventures have also developed, and
they now account for a little over 25% of industrial output5. The
impressive growth of this sector is likely to be maintained,
although the extent of this will be dependent upon its access to
scarce financial resources. Yet despite these developments the
SOEs still consume a far greater share of scarce state financial
resources than those in the non state sector, approximately three
quarters of state industrial investment. As a consequence the
government is increasingly investing scarce resources in declining
industries, which will ultimately contribute to a decline in
economic growth should this remain unchanged.

5

The ‘other’ category in Table 3.

Table 3
Real Gross Value of Industrial Production (GVIO) 1990-95
% Growth Rate

1990

G VIO

GV IO

GVIO

G V IO

T o ta l

SOEs

C o llectiv e

O th er3

5.2

2.7

6.2

47.4

1991

12.8

7.6

17.3

40.7

1992

21.4

13.1

32.9

50.6

1993

23.8

9.1

39.9

59.5

1994

21.6

2.1

30.5

43.5

1995

16.0

9.0

25.0

30.0

e GVIO of private, foreign invested and other enterprises.
Source: State Statistical Bureau
Table 4
Estimated Rates of Annual Productivity Growth in Chinese
Industry (% change)

1980-84
A.

1984-88

1988-92

Total Factor Productivity
State sector

1.8

3.0

2 .5 a

Urban and township

3.4

5.9

4 .9 a

To w n sh ip -V illag e

7 .3 a

6 .6 a

6 .9 a

3.8

6.2

4.7

Urban and township

8.6

7.0

13.8

T o w n sh ip -V illag e

5.8

14.4

17.7

C ollective sector

B

Labour Productivity (real terms)
State sector
C ollective sector

a Preliminary results.
Sources: Taken from Jefferson and Rawski (1994), p.56.
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Although many reformers have recommended widespread
bankruptcies or privatisation of the SOEs, this could create major
social unrest and the government has already rejected large scale
privatisation. Indeed the government still views the state owned
sector as the backbone of the economy. With seven of every 10
Chinese industrial workers employed in state enterprises, over
100 million workers, the potential fall out from extensive
bankruptcy would be immense. In many areas they are the sole
employers and providers of social services, from housing to
transport to health care and education. This would also have
adverse consequences for already widening regional income
disparities. Thus, even if sustaining the loss makers among them
with loans is inflationary and wasteful, the alternative of mass
shutdown could be a recipe for mass social unrest. More recently
a middle ground has emerged, described as to "grasp the large
and sacrifice the small". This involves a three pronged approach
which will essentially involve leasing, selling or closing small
failing companies, restructuring the robust ones, and sustaining
with state funds those enterprises of national importance6. These
alternative models and their application in China is discussed in
the following section.
The continuing weakness of SOE performance has arisen from
a number of factors. Administrative control on the prices of key
products such as coal, oil, grain, and other essential products.
With the recent further liberalisation of prices, losses because of
this are likely to be greatly reduced. A more important reason has
been the organisational structure of the SOEs, which is
characterised by insufficient managerial autonomy and
accountability, the lack of hard budget constraints, rigidities in
wages and employment, overstaffing (many economists believe
that SOEs have about a third more employees than they require),

6

The so called ‘pillar industries’ as described by Premier Li Peng.
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a heavy burden of social benefits for their workers (housing,
education, health and pensions) and the use of obsolescent
technology. In a number of these areas progress has been made,
but the recent experience of 1996 in which the SOEs were
extended easy credit by the commercial state banks and further
subsidies by the government undermines the attainment of
managerial accountability and the credible imposition of a hard
budget constraint. It also makes it impossible to develop indirect
policy instruments operating through financial markets as a
means of attaining macroeconomic control in a market oriented
economy. For example, in 1995 when the government twice raised
interest rates in an attempt to reduce the demand for loans, this
had little effect on the SOEs. The linkage between the SOEs and
the commercial state banks needs to be broken, or else further
reform will be impossible. There is considerable resistance to such
a development. For example by the end of 1996 the Chinese
authorities had to retreat from transforming large scale state
enterprises, mostly because their managers resisted efforts at
accountability. The government had planned to corporatise 100
large scale enterprises by converting them into shareholding or
limited liability companies. As it turned out, more than 80
preferred the form of solely state owned enterprises, a far cry
from the goal of the experiment. With easy access to credit and
little accountability this is a much easier option for an SOE
manager.
Such problems make reform in other key sectors, such as the
financial sector, much more difficult. State industry owes the
state banking system a great deal of money. For a start, the 5
trillion yuan (US$600 billion) of bank loans outstanding in China,
nine-tenths of it to state industry, account for an unusually high
proportion of all financing, equivalent to about 70% of GDP.
China has only one private bank, and no meaningful capital
markets, hence the job of financing investment rests almost wholly
13

with the state banks. The Chinese save the equivalent of oVer 40%
of GDP, nearly all of which is deposited with state banks because
of the lack at present of alternatives. The stockmarket still
remains very small. As much as nine-tenths of bank loans go to
the state sector, hence domestic savings are not being used most
efficiently. Household and corporate savings are drawn off in the
prosperous coastal areas and, through the state credit plan,
recycled to those parts of the country to support relatively
inefficient SOEs. The money lent by banks to the state sector has
risen, from 500 billion yuan (US$86 billion) at the end of 1993 to
over 1 trillion yuan (US$120 billion) by the end of 1996.
Conservative estimates put the increase in bad debts each year at
50-60 billion yuan, with total bad debts amounting to more than
25% of the banks' assets. In addition to SOE debt to the state
banks there is also SOE debts to other SOEs. Such debts between
the SOEs the government and the state banks is known as
triangular debt. This could amount to over 800 billion yuan by the
end of 1996.
It is clear from the discussion in this section the extent of the
task facing the authorities. However further reform of the
economy, and the movement towards a market economy, requires
action to be taken in the area of loss making SOEs and the
financial sector. Should such reforms not be forthcoming there will
be an inevitable slow down in the growth of the economy, a loss
of jobs and the development of social unrest which the authorities
all along have been concerned with avoiding.
3. REFORMING THE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES

Enterprise reforms prior to 1993
Until reforms were initiated, the SOEs had little autonomy. Their
production, pricing, and investment decisions were subject to the
planning process, they transferred all surplus funds to the state
14

budget, and they relied on the budget for subsidies to cover losses
and grants for investment. Few incentives were available to
workers or management, wages were set by centrally determined
scales, and the managers' main responsibility was to fulfill
production quotas. Early reforms aimed to increase enterprise
autonomy and accountability. In this regard the issuance of the
"Provisional Regulations on the Enlargement of Autonomy of
State Industrial Enterprises" in 1984 represented an important
step. These regulations permitted an increase in autonomy for
above target output in terms of price setting, output sales, and
input purchases. Also, in 1984-85, an enterprise income tax on
SOEs was introduced, and these tax payments replaced profit
remittances as the main source of fiscal revenue from enterprises.
Enterprises were allowed to retain most of their after tax profits
and their depreciation funds. In 1986 the Contract Responsibility
System (CRS) was introduced, for medium sized and larger SOEs.
Under this targets were specified for the enterprise over a three or
four year period for its performance in terms of output, profit
remittances and taxes to the government. An enterprise's income
tax liability under the CRS was determined by the provisions of
the enterprise's contract instead of by law, leading to a strong
element of bargaining in the fiscal process. The first generation of
these contracts, signed by at least 90% of the SOEs, was in place
by 1988. To accompany these changes, a bankruptcy law was
enacted in 1986 and became effective in 1988, but until recently it
was hardly used against SOEs. In 1988 the authorities also
enacted an Enterprise Law, which seeked to transform the SOEs
into fully autonomous legal entities responsible for their own
profits and losses. In July 1992, the implementing regulations of
the Enterprise Law of 1988, entitled "Regulations on
Transforming the Operating Mechanisms of SOEs", were issued
by the State Council. These regulations explicitly provided for non
interference by the government in the operations of the
15

enterprises, which were endowed with a set of 14 rights (see
below), including the right to decide what to produce and how to
price and market their products, how to invest their funds, the
right to hire and fire workers and to decide on wage policy, with
the objective of transforming the SOEs into autonomous legal
entities responsible for their own profits and losses. Inefficient
and loss making ones were to be reconstructed or closed down in
accordance with the Bankruptcy Law. The role of the state as
owner of the enterprises is delegated to the State Asset
Management Bureau. Enterprises had, in summary, the right to
enjoy the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

to make production and business decisions
to set their own prices
to market their own products
to purchase materials
to import and export
to make investment decisions
to decide on the use of retained earnings
to dispose of assets in accordance with production
requirements
to form partnerships and mergers
to assign labour
to have personnel management
to set wages and bonuses
to determine internal organisations

•

to refuse arbitrary levies and charges

Although the initial impact of these reforms was a recovery in
the output of SOEs, price controls persisted, production quotas
for sale to the state remained part of the contracts, the SOEs had
access to certain amounts of cheap raw materials, credit was
readily available for investment or working capital, the budget
16

continued to provide support for loss-making enterprises, and
little advantage was taken of reforms to wage and employment
practices. In short the SOEs continued to face a soft budget
constraint.
The incompleteness of the reforms jeopardised macroeconomic
management, with SOEs contributing to the rapid rate of credit
expansion in the late 1980s and early 1990s, reflecting mounting
demands on the state budget to cover enterprise losses, low
revenue buoyancy, the accumulation of large inventories of
unmarketable products (either because of excess production or
low quality), and the associated growth of inter-enterprise
arrears. To address these problems, the authorities during 1991
announced some 20 measures, 12 of which were to improve the
operations and external environment of the SOEs, and the others
were aimed at facilitating the operation of market forces on the
SOEs. Some measures, such as reducing mandatory planning,
were further steps toward a market economy, but others, such as
preferential access to credit and tax concessions, continued
existing interventionist policies. Indeed, during the rectification
program of 1988 and 1989, a large number of SOEs were given
preferential access to credit and raw materials under a "mutual
pledge" or "double guarantee" system, which obliged them to
deliver specified amounts of output to the state.
Another key area of enterprise reform was aimed at changing
the governance structure, accounting procedures and ownership
rights, in addition to the previously mentioned management
rights, of SOEs, to make them more appropriate in the context of
a market economy. A number of experiments in this regard were
applied primarily to large SOEs:
1. reforms establishing the formation of "enterprise groups"
along the lines of the Japanese keiretsus, but more closely so to
that of the South Korean chaebols, integrated through a
parent-subsidiary relationship. Some of these groups have
17

been required to take over loss making enterprises to help
rationalise their operations,
2. another development in the restructuring of SOEs involved the
"grafting" of SOEs with foreign investment. In such an
arrangement, an SOE would typically invite foreign
participation in certain lines of production, and a joint
venture would be formed, under which the SOE would
provide the land, buildings, and labour, and the foreign
partner the equipment, technology and marketing expertise.
This was later increasingly used by the Chinese authorities as
a means of foreign investors gaining access to the Chinese
market,
3. another experiment in reforming the governance structure of
enterprises was the introduction of corporate forms of
ownership and management. Provisions for limited liability
private companies were introduced in 1990, and the
shareholding experiment was formally sanctioned for SOEs. In
late 1990, stock exchanges were established in Shanghai and
Shenzhen, although provisional regulations on the issuance of
securities were made public by the Shanghai and Shenzhen
municipal governments only in 1992.
In addition reforms of the labour and employment system were
also initiated to provide for greater flexibility at the enterprise
level in terms of worker selection, task definition and wages.
Reform in terms of the social benefits system, including
unemployment benefits, pensions, and health care, aimed at
establishing pooled benefits schemes and a separation of the
provision of benefits from specific enterprises were also begun.
Reforms aimed at commercialising the housing market have also
been recently launched. Some SOEs have separated service
activities from enterprise operations, creating autonomous units
that are responsible for their own profits and losses. Other
18

reforms during this period affecting SOEs have included price
liberalisation, the reduction of the scope of the mandatory plans,
the introduction of markets for land use rights, the liberalisation
of the foreign exchange market, the opening of new sectors and
regions to foreign trade and investment, and the deepening of
financial markets.
Despite the numerous experiments with SOE reforms in the
1980s their performance remained weak, with about one third of
SOEs estimated to be making losses, and another one third were
breaking even. Autonomy and financial accountability remained
weak. SOEs still operated predominantly under the direct
supervision of the central or local governments. The retrenchment
period of the late 1980s and early 1990s highlighted the weakness
of the SOEs sector. However beginning in 1991, several large
SOEs were transformed into joint stock companies and listed
their shares on both domestic and international stock exchanges.
This was to be given further impetus with reforms after 1993.
A new phase o f SOE reform after 1993
The thrust of the new phase of reforms is to change enterprise
governance, with the objective of establishing a modem enterprise
sector consistent with the attainment of a socialist market
economy as proclaimed by the Chinese authorities in October
1992. This aim is to be achieved through the corporatisation of
SOEs, that is, the conversion of SOEs into shareholding
companies through the implementation of a new Company Law
enacted in December 1993 and which became effective in July
1994. The new companies will be vested with a corporate
governance structure that generally follows international practice.
Through this, the authorities aim to achieve a separation of the
ownership functions of the state from the management of the
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enterprises, within a framework of greater autonomy and
accountability. Specifically, the new framework will:
1. clarify the rights of enterprises as legal entities entitled to
make decisions concerning assets entrusted to them by owners
and investors,
2. separate government ministries and departments from
enterprise management to eliminate government interference in
enterprise management,
3. relieve SOEs of the obligation to provide social services while
expanding the government's role in the provision of these
services,
4. establish market based relations between enterprises, so as to
avoid the recurrent accumulation of inter-enterprise debt,
5. reduce the government's control over wage and employment
policies while limiting its role in this sphere to a supervisory
one.
In this new framework, a system for the management of state
owned assets by state holding companies, state asset
management companies, and enterprise groups would be
introduced. To permit enterprises in the new system to function
effectively, supporting measures were to be introduced, including
the implementation of Company Law, the enactment of a national
securities law, the implementation of a new accounting system,
and the development of factor markets. In addition, to support
enterprise reform, the authorities set up in 1994 a fund of Yuan 7
billion designated for debt repayment.
In early 1994, shortly after the Third Plenum of the 14th
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in November
1993, the government launched a pilot project, or experiment, for
the establishment of a modem enterprise system. This project
involved 10,000 medium sized and large SOEs in a program that
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included asset valuation, the granting of financial autonomy, and
the adoption of a new accounting system. Of these, 1,000
enterprises, deemed to be critical to the economy, were selected
for an experiment that would delegate to asset management firms
the authority to oversee the management of these enterprises'
assets with the objective of increasing their value over time.
Another 100 enterprises were to become corporatised and thereby
to participate in an expansion of the existing shareholding
system. Finally, ten major cities, later increased to eighteen, were
selected for a comprehensive enterprise reform program: including
pension pooling; staff lay-off and bankruptcies. The whole
project was initially expected to take two to three years to
complete. The medium term goal of such reform was to transform
most SOEs into autonomous, competitive, legal entities fully
accountable for their profits and losses, and in the process of
which to create a level playing field for all enterprises.
While the new phase of enterprise reform places a heavy
emphasis on the maintenance of public ownership as the
cornerstone of the economy, it does represent a fundamental
change in the concept of ownership of SOEs. A distinction was to
be drawn between the ownership of an enterprise and its
management, the rights of ownership are circumscribed by law,
and enterprises are regarded as legal entities with their own rights
and responsibilities. Such a clarification of the concept of
ownership was seen as being necessary for a fundamental
restructuring of the SOEs. This, in conjunction with the
implementation of a standardised accounting system, would lay
the foundations for the possibility of privatisation at a later date.
In addition, the predominance of public ownership in this new
ownership system was to be confined to certain strategic sectors
of the economy. Considerable diversification in the ownership
structure of the Chinese economy as a whole over a number of
years has taken place. This has occurred through the promotion of
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a dynamic, collectively owned enterprise sector, joint ventures,
foreign funded enterprises, private and individually owned
businesses, the shareholding or corporatisation experiments, the
divestiture by SOEs of some of their ancillary activities by selling
or leasing part of enterprise assets to individuals or groups of
individuals, and the divestiture by the state of enterprises
themselves. The Company Law of 1994 therefore represented a
major step in the SOE reform process, enabling for the first time a
unified legal framework for the establishment and operation of
companies as independent identities.
Despite these developments in ownership structure the
message from the government remains clear, however, that reform
of the state sector will have clear limits. Public ownership of the
largest state firms will remain sacrosanct and bankruptcies will be
isolated. As reiterated at the National People's Congress in
March 1996, the state sector will remain the backbone of the
economy. Under the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000) reform of
the state sector is seen as being a top priority, and the State
Commission for Restructuring the Economy (SCRES) has
indicated that reform of the Chinese economy will lead to the loss
of 18 million jobs at state owned firms during the period of it.
In the remainder of this section a number of experiments
relating to improving the performance of the SOEs will be
discussed. These will focus upon: corporatisation, the
establishment of enterprise groups; approaches to improving the
performance of small and medium sized SOEs, approaches to
loss making enterprises.
C orporatisation

The major thrust of SOE reforms has been to focus on their
corporatisation and commercialisation, with the objective of
separating
government
administration
from
enterprise
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management. In this regard the shareholding system is an
important experiment in enterprise reform that has major
ramifications for the ownership structure of enterprises and has
received widespread interest. Under this system, enterprises are
allowed to restructure themselves into limited liability companies
by issuing shares. The shareholding system (or corporatisation)
provides for a clear separation between the ownership and
management of the enterprises and is therefore a way of
restructuring the relationship between the government and the
enterprises under its control. Several thousand enterprises are
participating in this exercise. For example by the end of 1993
there were about 11,600 of such companies in China, of which
8,300 were limited liability companies and 3,300 were joint stock
companies. All of these companies can apply for listing in the
country's two stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen. The
authorities, however, do not regard the conversion of SOEs into
shareholding companies as "privatisation". Instead they see this
as a means of raising funds for restructuring and of introducing a
more effective management system, while the state retains a
significant ownership share and ultimate control over companies.
The development of the shareholding system has been boosted by
the establishment of stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen,
to list the shares of approved joint stock companies. These are
shareholding companies that issue shares to the general public
and that may apply for listing on the two stock exchanges. In the
restructuring, the proportion of the shares belonging to the state,
municipality, or township is determined by an appraisal
company according to the net value of the assets in the enterprise
accruing to the state, municipality or township.
With regard to the extent of state participation in shareholding
companies, four levels of government ownership were envisaged:
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1. in certain priority sectors, defined as those characterised by
market failures or that produced goods deemed to be of
national strategic significance, enterprises will remain wholly
owned by the government,
2. the second level will consist of enterprises with majority
government ownership.,
3. the third level will comprise enterprises with minority
shareholding by the government,
4. finally, some small enterprises engaged primarily in
commercial activities will be auctioned or leased to
individuals, with the state not being represented in the
ownership structure.
After an enterprise has been turned into a shareholding
company, the state's position as the sole owner will disappear in
cases 2, 3 and 4.. As one among many owners with equity rights,
the state will only participate in the decision making to the extent
of its representation. The authorities envisage that, even in
enterprises in which the state is the majority shareholder, the
effective separation of ownership from management will be
achieved by requiring the government act according to the statutes
of the new company/enterprise law.
Considerable progress was made during 1993 and in 1994
with the new Company Law, in extending and formalising the
shareholding system. Although experiments with the issuance of
stocks as a means of raising capital began in the early 1980s,
these stocks had no legal standing and, hence, were restricted in
terms of ownership rights and transferability. Since 1990, a
number of important measures have been taken to legalise the
corporate form of enterprises and the issuance of stock, leading
to, as mentioned above, the establishment of stock exchanges in
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Shanghai and Shenzhen7. The 1994 Company Law provided a
legal and unified basis for the establishment and operations of
companies in China. Under it two forms of companies may be
established, a limited liability company and a joint stock
company. Specifically, the law covers all forms of ownership —
private, public and FFEs and; does not provide for a mandatory
m in im u m state sh areh old in g in a company; eliminates the
distinction between state held, corporate owned and individual
private person shares; specifies a framework of corporate
governance in the form of a board of directors and board of
supervisors; prohibits government officials from serving as
company directors, supervisors, or general managers; stipulates
minimum capital requirements for various types of companies;
and clearly defines conditions for share transfer or sale. Also, it
outlines procedures for corporate mergers, bankruptcy, and the
liquidation of companies.
While the emergence of joint stock companies and equity
markets is still of limited significance from an economic
standpoint, they do represent a major change in the ideological
framework of reforms in China. They are an important constituent
part of a broader process of ownership change, and the growth of
the stock exchanges have provided an important impetus for new
accounting standards to replace the existing accounting standards
which were not adequate to support public trading in shares. In
addition they are no longer seen as being at odds with the
institutional underpinnings of a "socialist" economy, since there
will still be the predominance of public ownership. At first, the
shares of the companies listed on the stock exchanges were issued
only to domestic residents (A shares). Since 1991, however, some

7

A decision was taken in 1993 to extend the right to list shares of joint stock
companies to cities other than Shanghai and Shenzhen.
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companies have been permitted to issue B shares8, denominated
in local currency, but purchased by foreigners with payment in
foreign exchange. Foreign investors are guaranteed convertibility
of their investment and earnings into foreign exchange at the swap
market rate. Indeed some SOEs have been listed on stock
exchanges overseas.
At the end of 1993, as part of the SOE reform process, a
decision was made to select a batch of 100 large state enterprises,
from among the 1000 or so large enterprises that have a
significant bearing on the economy, for conversion to limited
liability joint stock companies, Primary ownership would remain
with the state, but with corporate organisation otherwise
completely restructured. The pilot program was started in 1995
with a further 300 enterprises due to join in 1996. This indicated
that the authorities were moving in the direction of a batch by
batch commercialisation of firms, which could potentially be
followed by privatisation if and when political constraints
allowed.
A number of advantages arising from this shareholding
arrangement were seen by the authorities:
1.
2.
3.

8

it facilitated the separation of government ownership from
management,
it facilitated the mobilisation and rational allocation of
financial resources,
it facilitated the provision of greater financial and decision
making autonomy, so that enterprises could become more
efficient and respond dynamically to changing market
opportunities.
In addition, and more recently, there are the so called ‘red chip’ shares and H
shares. The former are shares of mainland China owned enterprises listed on
the Hong Kong stock exchange, while the latter are the shares of subsidiaries
of mainland China owned enterprises listed on the Hong Kong stock
exchange and based in Hong Kong.
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While the major incentive from the perspective of enterprises
to list on the stock exchanges is the ability to raise equity funds
for restructuring and upgrading, over the longer run the greater
discipline on enterprise management that is likely to result from
the scrutiny that listed companies are subject to from both
shareholders and investors will be more significant. This is
particularly the case with those enterprises that are listed abroad,
where public disclosure requirements are more stringent, and the
scrutiny from institutional investors more rigorous. Nevertheless,
the transformation of enterprises into corporations cannot, alone,
ensure
greater
operational
efficiency
or
profitability.
Complementary and supplementary changes in other areas are
essential to create a competitive environment for SOEs, such as
the enforcement of a hard budget constraint through the
commercialisation of the banking sector and a wider application
of the Bankruptcy Law to non profitable enterprises. In addition
it is essential to further liberalise prices and develop competitive
markets for goods and factors of production. In this sense, the
supporting changes that are under way in the areas of taxation,
banking, housing markets, and the provision of social security are
at least as important for bringing about a lasting improvement in
SOE performance as the process of corporatisation itself.
Several problems still remain to be resolved with respect to
such an enterprise experiment. The first concerns the
establishment of a strong legal framework governing the issuance
and trading of shares. Second, asset valuation and accounting
practices need to be standardised across enterprises. Third the
pace of reform of the social security system needs to be quickened
to enable fundamental restructuring of the SOE sector. Fourth,
financial sector reforms need to be accelerated so that, unlike in
1996, banks can no longer be prevailed upon by central and local
authorities to grant loans to uncreditworthy enterprises, which, in
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turn, has important implications for hardening enterprise budget
constraints. Finally, some questions remain on whether a true
separation of the state's role as an owner and as a manager can
be achieved as long as the majority, or even the largest minority of
shareholders, are agents of the state. In addition the
corporatisation reforms have been met by much resistance by SOE
managers, especially over the issue of accountability. The initial
results from the batch of 100 large SOEs to be corporatised has
been very disappointing. The intention of the Chinese authorities
was to corporatise these enterprises by converting them into
shareholding or limited liability companies by the end of 1996. As
it turned out, however, more than 80 of them preferred the form
of solely state owned enterprises, and continued financial
support from the state, a far cry from the goal of the trial. This is
perhaps not surprising given the easing of access to credit for
"pillar industries" through the state banking system which
occurred in 1996, without the need for accountability by managers
to shareholders.
E n terp rise groups

Another experiment that is being encouraged is the formation of
large enterprise groups, with the aim of rationalising the industrial
structure by taking advantage of economies of scale and
promoting the optimum use of resources. In China each locality
was encouraged to be fully self-reliant during the pre-reform
period. Furthermore, enterprises within one branch of an industry
were normally not allowed to diversify into related fields. As a
result, from a national perspective, there is much duplication, a
lack of specialisation, and strong local barriers to inter-regional
trade. The aim of the authorities is to break down the
departmental, regional, and ownership barriers in the economy
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and create large conglomerates that are efficient and
internationally competitive.
Several hundred "enterprise groups" were formed in the early
1990s, and a review concluded that 431 of these qualified as
genuine enterprise groups, with effective control exerted directly
over branch plants by a large core firm, thus breaking down the
bureaucratic and administrative barriers that had made
enterprises appendages of the bureaucratic apparatus. Many of
these groups have diversified interests, and often hold foreign
trade rights. Indeed, the Chinese government designated 100 of
these enterprise groups to receive government support. The stated
objective is to create a nucleus of large corporate groups like the
Japanese keiretsu or Korean chaebol. These groups will have
diversified production interests and substantial financial depth,
and will be encouraged to operate internationally. These firms
operate with substantial autonomy, sometimes aided by political
patronage ties with top politicians and military figures. They can
be clearly distinguished from limited experiments with enterprise
groups and "horizontal linkages" in the 1980s, as the new
enterprise groups of the 1990s seem to be genuine corporations
with substantial autonomy and international outlook.
In the past two years the government has selected 55 large
enterprise groups for restructuring to strengthen the role of the
parent or core enterprise within each group, particularly its
management of the subsidiary enterprises. Preferential treatment
such as trading rights or the right to diversify into other fields of
activity are being provided to these enterprise groups, to
encourage their development into competitive conglomerates.
Since there is much duplication in Chinese industry, with
hundreds of inefficient small factories often making the same
things, this does make economic sense. In this regard lessons can
be learned from the Japanese keiretsu system, in which individual
Japanese companies, often with their own stockmarket listings,
29

are linked together through cross shareholdings. At the core is a
bank which, in conjunction with other firms in the family, support
one another and favour each other in their business dealings.
However in the context of China the real model for the
development of enterprise groups is that provided by the South
Korean chaebols, which are far less structured in their range of
business than the big Japanese companies and, to some extent,
more closely linked to the state. In South Korea the ten leading
chaebols control around two thirds of the economy, and they
have underpinned the country's rapid rate of economic
development since the 1960s. The Chinese appear to be
impressed by the fact that the chaebol helped to transform South
Korea from a poor hungry nation into a rich one within a
generation, and that the chaebol are now transforming themselves
into multinationals. It is however ironic that just as South Korea's
government is trying to reduce the influence that the chaebol exert
on the domestic economy, that China's policy makers are
contemplating the development of their own chaebol.
Small/medium sized SOEs
The Chinese government appears, as previously indicated, to be
concentrating its reform efforts on some 1,000 of the biggest
SOEs. The remaining 117,000 consist primarily of smaller and
medium sized SOEs, where the plan is to turn the majority of
these firms into:
1. mixed ownership through the creation of joint ventures
2. private enterprises through sales to private domestic
individuals/ firms
3. private foreign enterprises through sales to foreign private
individuals/firms as wholly foreign funded enterprises
4. allowed to go bankrupt.
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Both central and local government in China have been
attempting to reinvigorate small and medium sized SOEs through
ad hoc experiments with management control. The objective being
to enable the development of sufficient managerial skills enabling
these enterprises to operate profitably before they are released
from state control. A number of "models" for the development of
these state enterprises can be found particularly at the local
government level, when they were given renewed authority to
experiment with their own firms after 1991. With the renewed
pressure of enterprise losses it was felt that local governments
were in a better position to deal with loss making smaller
enterprises. In this regard a number of examples can be identified,
which show the kind of experiments taking shape in the state
sector:
1. In Zhucheng city, Shandong province, the sale of
enterprises/plants to their workers is taking place. This
experiment has been used extensively with workers
compulsorily buying shares in their enterprises, electing a
board of directors and supervisory committee. All but a
handful of Zhucheng's 288 state owned enterprises have been
sold, mostly to their workers, producing a remarkable
improvement in profits according to local officials. Vice
Premier Zhu Rongji toured the city in March 1996 to approve
its reforms,
2. in Henan province workers have been involved in electing
managers in nearly 1,000 factories. Some 85% of them are now
reported to be making profits.
3. the giving away of state assets to new owners has also
happened in Zhucheng dty,
4. sale of small state run factories, which had occurred on a very
limited scale during the 1980s, increased rapidly from 199231

93. For example, the city of Wuhan announced a program to
sell off small state firms to any buyers, including private
enterprises or groups of investors. This was designed to
unload loss making enterprises, and included substantial tax
breaks for buyers who took over firms making large losses or
with debts greater than assets.
5 . fo istin g o ff a w e a k S O E u p o n a w o u ld be jo in t v e n tu re p a rtn e r
as a precondition for entry into the Chinese market, thereby
gaining access to capital and technology to enhance its
efficiency and profitability,
6. leasing on the basis of a "transfer operate transfer" basis,
whereby an investor runs an SOE for a period of time, earning
profits, while returning it to profitability and ultimately back
to the appropriate authority
Loss making enterprises
The Chinese authorities are taking special measures to deal with
loss making enterprises according to the nature of their losses,
and bearing in mind the current low level of development of the
social safety net. It is estimated that about 70% of the losses of
SOEs are policy induced, mainly arising from price control. These
enterprises are mainly concentrated in the transportation and
energy sectors. If these enterprises are to be financially
independent, it is necessary to liberalise the prices of the goods
and services they produce. It is intended to liberalise the prices of
coal and other energy products over the next three-five years to
avoid major disruption to the rest of the economy. In the interim
before profitability, or reduced losses, are ultimately achieved, the
policy induced losses of those enterprises will continue to be
subsidised through the budget.
For remaining enterprises that are experiencing losses because
of poor management, the authorities are providing fiscal and
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financial incentives for them to restructure or move into other lines
of production. Several thousands of smaller enterprises have been
either closed or merged with profitable ones to rationalise their
operations. In some cities, experiments are being carried out to
allow foreign investors to buy into and restructure existing loss
making SOEs. Finally, the authorities are cautiously applying the
bankruptcy law to the enterprises.
Despite the revival of SOE reform since 1993, China has
clearly not undertaken large scale privatisation of state assets.
The bulk of the change in ownership structure in the Chinese
economy has occurred through the growth of non state producers
— collectives, private and foreign invested companies — rather
than through the transformation of the state sector. A key
question facing reformers in China, is whether the continuation of
predominant public ownership represents an insuperable barrier
to the functioning of markets and efficient resource allocation. The
authorities have consistently maintained their preference for
public ownership as a means of achieving its vision of a socialist
market economy. Such a system would be characterised by
increased competition and the elimination of mandatory planning,
but not necessarily with "private ownership" as in a capitalist
system. The objective is to retain the predominance of public
ownership, supplemented by nonstate and private ownership,
while achieving an effective separation between state ownership
and control of enterprises. Although the development of a
socialist market economy is a recent goal (1992), marking an
important change in the ideology of economic reform in China,
throughout the reform process ownership structures have been
modified in a number of important respects with major
implications for enterprise management. In particular, these
modifications might be viewed as an attempt to simulate market
conditions by encouraging profit maximisation behaviour.
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Important changes have taken place at both ends of the
spectrum of state ownership. As previously discussed the larger
and more modem and profitable state firms are increasingly being
"corporatised" into modem corporate forms of various types,
including limited liability joint stock companies. At the same time,
local governments have been given greater freedom to deal with
the smaller and less profitable state firms, and one of the
methods they have adopted, as indicated previously, is to sell
them off. As a result the traditional state owned sector is being
reduced from both ends of the spectrum. In addition many of the
financial and other preconditions for ownership reform and
privatisation are being created. In this regard China's two stock
exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen can be viewed as an
indication of fundamental change. However it is also important to
recognise that this has been a tightly controlled experiment, and
substantial limitations have been imposed on their development.
The number of companies listed on the two exchanges has been
tightly controlled by administrative decisions. Moreover,
ownership of joint stock companies continued to be held
overwhelmingly by government bodies. For example, of all
Shanghai joint stock companies at the end of 1992, 62% of the
share value was held by the government, 24% was held by "legal
persons" (predominantly other state enterprises), 7% by domestic
individuals, and 7% by foreign capital. Virtually every individual
corporation is securely controlled by the government or its agents.
Thus, the share system, as yet, has not been the vehicle for a
significant divestment of SOEs, but it has the potential to be so in
the future.
4. OTHER SOE REFORM RELATED ISSUES

To make the SOEs financially accountable, to judge them by
strictly economic criteria, and to abide by a hard budget
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constraint, it has been necessary to change the old system of
employment, social benefits, and housing so that enterprises are
not burdened with social responsibilities. In this regard a number
of important developments have already taken place.
Employment
Under the traditional employment system, the state assigned
workers to enterprises that were obliged to provide jobs. The
workers were guaranteed lifetime employment and were provided
with housing, medical, and retirement benefits, and a basic salary
that depended on the worker's years of service. Such a system
was: highly rigid; resulted in overstaffing in most SOEs; resulted
in virtually no labour mobility; produced little correspondence
between the remuneration of workers and their productivity.
Employment reform in China is often characterised as trying to
break the three irons, namely, the iron rice bowl (guaranteed
employment, housing, and other benefits such as that relating to
health), the iron chair (job security) and the iron wage (wages that
are not related to performance). In 1986 a labour contract system
was first introduced, for all newly recruited workers in the SOEs.
Under this system, the terms and conditions of employment are
determined by a contract signed between the employee and the
enterprise. On the expiration of the contract, both the enterprise
and th e em p lo y er are free to ch o o se w h eth er to co n tin u e or
terminate the contract. However, progress in introducing the
system was slow. For example at the end of 1992 it was
estimated that the system covered only about 16 million workers,
about 21% of the total number of employees in the SOEs.
In 1992, the authorities announced that reform of the
employment system would be accelerated. A modified version of
the labour contract system was to be encouraged for adoption by
all enterprises as soon as possible. Under this modified system,
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a ll em p lo y ee s, in clu d in g m a n a g ers, tech n ician s an d o p e ra to rs,

must sign a contract with their enterprises to decide their duties,
rights and benefits. The maturity of the contracts can either be
fixed or open ended. Under this system, certain distinctions
among employees such as permanent versus contract and cadres
versus workers will be ended. To replace the system of job
assignment by the state, employment agencies are being
established to help place the new entrants in the labour force.
The problem of surplus labour in SOEs is one of the most
difficult issues in reforming the enterprise system. It is estimated
that excess workers in the government and SOEs may be as high
as 20 million workers out of a total work force of over 100
million. To avoid massive unemployment, the authorities are
encouraging the development of the tertiary sector to absorb this
surplus labour. Under the old planning system, tertiary activities
were considered unproductive and therefore not encouraged. As a
result, many of the services that are essential in the smooth
functioning of a market system were neglected. Since the onset of
the reform process, the tertiary sector has grown from about 21%
to 27% of GNP, but it is still small in comparison with the average
of 60% in most developed countries. In July 1992, the authorities
announced several policies to stimulate the development of this
sector, including: encouraging the use of foreign capital and know
how; transforming most tertiary businesses into profit oriented
enterprises; encouraging staff in government organisations and
SOEs to resign and establish businesses in the service sector;
decontrolling the prices of most products and services; and
providing financial and tax incentives. The tertiary sector is
veiwed by the authorities as having great potential for absorbing
surplus labour, because this sector is generally more labour
intensive, comprising, for example, retailing and wholesaling,
catering, teaching, consulting, and social services. It is envisaged
that the tertiary sector will play a role analogous to that played
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by the TVEs in absorbing the surplus labour in the agricultural
sector during the 1980s.
Social security
To enforce a hard budget constraint on SOEs without adverse
social consequences, an adequate social safety net has to be
developed. An unemployment insurance scheme was set up in
1986 to provide benefits to the unemployed. To be eligible, the
unemployment must have resulted from the following causes — 1.
bankruptcy of an enterprise, 2. restructuring of an enterprise, 3.
termination of a labour contract, 4. firing because of violation of
rules. In addition to cash relief, the unemployment scheme
provided training to the unemployed and assistance in setting up
their own businesses. At present the unemployment insurance
scheme covers more than 70 million employees in the SOEs. In
some regions, it extends to employees in collective firms, joint
ventures and private enterprises. To extend the social safety net,
the authorities are formulating new regulations and plans to
improve benefits and expand the coverage of the unemployment
insurance system in the near future. In particular, unemployment
benefits will be provided to all involuntary unemployment
regardless of cause, and the coverage will be extended to
employees in collectively owned and foreign enterprises. Further,
to facilitate enterprise restructuring, some of the funds will be
used both to provide training for the surplus labour in the SOEs
and to develop new jobs.
In the past, retirement benefits were also provided by
enterprises out of current revenue. In recent years, retirement
funds have been set up whereby workers and employers are
required to contribute a certain percentage of the payroll toward
the funds. At present, such funds are established at the municipal
level in most cities and counties and at the provincial level in
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about 12 provinces. The intention is to establish a unified national
retirement fund at an appropriate time in the future. The
retirement funds have improved the conditions for labour
mobility, and have relieved enterprises of the burden of providing
for their retired workers.
Housing
Traditionally housing is an integral part of the employment
system, and is distributed to workers at a highly subsidised rate
on an administrative basis. Such a system discourages the
mobility of labour because the worker will generally not be able to
keep his/her apartment if he/she leaves the work unit. This
means that a worker will only leave if the new employer is able to
provide similar housing. This is a major constraint on labour
mobility and the establishment of a labour market. To encourage
the development of a housing market, the authorities have
announced a program of rent adjustment aimed at reducing the
subsidy element in housing. This development should lead to the
commercialisation of the housing sector. Encouragement of the
sale of housing is another component of housing reform.
5. PRIVATISATION EXPERIENCES OF OTHER ECONOMIES IN
TRANSITION

Much of the literature on economic transition from a planned to
market economy focuses upon the need to implement changes that
will: impose financial discipline upon enterprises, through the
imposition of a hard budget constraint by eliminating access to
soft finance in the form of bank credits on easy non commercial
terms and the accumulation of inter enterprise arrears; lead to the
opening up of markets to competition; enable the entry of new
firms and exit of non viable firms to and from such markets; and
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bring about decentralised ownership change. Such changes would
encourage the necessary conditions for enterprise restructuring,
and especially amongst state enterprises. As a means of
increasing competition and improving performance in markets
and enterprises, decentralisation of ownership, in particular, is
seen as being a key ingredient. In the context of the Central and
Eastern European transition economies, as well as the Newly
Independent States of the former Soviet Union, most have made
the unambiguous decision to move to decentralised ownership by
having the majority of their economies under private sector
control. This has been achieved through the privatisation of state
assets and, for many the most important way, through the entry
of new private businesses both domestically and foreign owned.
The imposition of financial discipline, as well as the
intensification of competition in markets for the products of SOEs
in these transition economies, has forced them to restructure, with
the objective of improving their efficiency and profitability.
However the initial implication of such developments has been
major labour shedding and a fall in real wages, or a combination
of the two. For example, in the three leading transition economies
of Central Europe, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, their
largest 150 to 200 SOEs reduced their work forces by 32, 47 and
33 percent respectively between 1989 and 1993 as their sales fell
by 40 to 60 percent on average. Evidence from the transition
economies suggest that once SOEs are subject to financial
discipline show: a more aggressive attitude towards the collection
of receivables; a much stronger link between profitability and
investment; a re-orientation of goals from output targets to
profits; more managerial focus on marketing and product quality.
A key question of concern for the transition economies, and of
particular interest to China, is whether privatisation is essential
for imposing financial discipline on enterprises with the objective
of stimulating their restructuring and enhancing their
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competitiveness. Could such favourable developments also be
achieved with public or mixed ownership. Empirical literature
primarily from the 1980s for industrial market economies,
concludes in general, although not uniformly, that private firms
exhibit higher productivity and better performance than public
enterprises. In the transition economies of Central and Eastern
Europe and the Newly Independent States, because it is quite
recent, judgment on the impact of privatisation has only recently
emerged. The first signs are encouraging in many cases, less so in
others. Evidence from Hungary, Poland Russia and Slovenia,
suggest that newly privatatised firms behave differently from,
and better than, state firms, exhibiting more dynamism and
generating higher profits. This of course may in part be a reflection
of the fact that only the more productive and profitable state
firms were the first to be privatised.
Such evidence from these transition economies suggest that
private ownership can make a difference in terms of enterprise
performance. However the urgency and speed with which it has
been conducted, has varied significantly across these economies.
While it may not represent an optimal solution, a slower process
of privatisation is likely to be more feasible in an economy where
the authorities, or workers, are able to exercise enough control
over state enterprises to prevent managers from absconding with
state assets, and where domestic saving and growth in the non
state sector are high. Such conditions would be representative of
the situation in China and to a much more limited extent in
Vietnam. On the other hand where enterprise managers are strong
but the authorities and workers are weak, and where available
funds are insufficient to meet restructuring needs, it is likely to be
the case that privatisation will be more urgent. This is more
representative of the situation arising from the fall of Communist
governments in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In a
number of these European countries this led to the undesirable
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development of "spontaneous" privatisation, in which managers
purchased state assets very cheaply or simply absconded with
them, and often in collusion with the former nomenclature elite.
This occurred in countries such as Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Russia and the Ukraine, creating much resentment to many from
such an illegal form of privatisation.
The transition economies' experience with privatising large enterprises
For many of the European transition economies the primary
objective of the economic reforms was to bring about market
economies with predominant private ownership as rapidly as
possible. This was especially the case for the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, who have been at the forefront of
development in the transition process. The initial predominance
of SOEs in their economies, inevitably, therefore, required moves
towards their privatisation. However each country has found that
privatising large and medium size enterprises has been more
difficult than originally anticipated. The process has not been
easy due to: policy makers having to weigh up complex and often
competing goals; the need to satisfy a multitude of competing
stakeholders; coping with the administrative difficulties involved
in privatising thousands of firms in a relatively short time; the
lack of mature and functioning domestic capital markets.
A number of alternative approaches towards privatisation by
transition economies can be identified, including sales to strategic
owners, insider buy-outs, and voucher programs involving the
creation of new financial intermediaries. These efforts are often
complemented by extensive programs of restitution to
pretransition owners and by smaller programs of debt equity
conversions or public offering of shares on newly emerging stock
markets. As summarised in Table 5 these approaches create trade
offs among the various objectives set by government from the
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process of privatistion. The major objectives include: improving
corporate governance and the efficiency of asset usage;
depoliticising firms by cutting their links to the state; establishing
new ownership rapidly; increasing firms' access to capital and
expertise; generating government revenue; and ensuring a fair
distribution of benefits. The various transition economies have
adopted an approach to privatisation which best suits their own
differing priorities and urgencies. In the case of Hungary, for
example, with its sizeable foreign debt, the need to generate
government revenue, particularly in the form of hard currency, has
been viewed as of critical importance. For the Czech Republic this
has been of considerably less significance. For the Russian
authorities priority was given to the need to break rapidly from
the past, while fairness was seen as being more important in the
case of Poland. The Czechs have consistently stressed the
significance of privatisation in breaking the link between an
enterprise and the government, while Estonia's privatisation
program sought out "real" owners capable of bringing new. money
and management skills to bear. Table 6 presents a summary of the
major methods of privatisation of medium sized and large
enterprises which have been adopted in seven transition
economies as at the end of 1995.
Table 5 provides only a partial view of the trade-offs arising
from the alternative approaches to privatisation. An additional
objective which should be given importance is each options'
ability to achieve long term institutional building in the context of
an economy in transtion. While the process of privatisation in
general can stimulate the development fundamental market
institutions such as capital markets, legal systems, and business
related professions, each approach to privatisation sets off a
complex process of institutional and ownership change whose
long run results may differ considerably from the shorter run
picture. For example, mass privatisation may not produce the
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best owners in the short run, but it might lead to a better
corporate governance in the long run if it promotes the
development of capital markets (and subsequent rearrangements
of ownership) and of intermediary monitoring institutions for the
economy as a whole. This should also be borne in mind.

Table 5
Tradeoffs Among Privatisation Routes for Large Firms

OBJECTIVE

METHOD

Better

Speed

corporate

and

governance feasibility

Better access

More

to capital government Greater
and skills

revenue

?

-

-

+

fairness

Spontaneous
privatisation

?

Sale to outside owners

+

-

+

-

+

-

-

7

+

? _

+

Management-employee
buyout
Equal-access voucher
privatisation

So u rce : T a k e n fro m W o rld B a n k , W o rld D e v e lo p m e n t R ep o rt
1 9 9 6 , p .5 2 .
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Table 6
Methods of Privatisation for Medium-Size and Large Enterprises in
Seven Transition Economies
(percentages of total)

Sale to
outside
owners

Managementemployee
buyout

Equalaccess
voucher
privatis
ation

Czech Republic
By number
By valued

32
5

0
0

22c
50

9
2

28
3

10
40

Estonia6
By number
By value

64
60

30
12

0
3

0
10

2
0

4
15

Hungary
By number
By value

38
40

7
2

0
0

0
4

33
12

22
42

Lithuania
By number
By value

<1
<1

5

5

70
60

0
0

0
0

25
35

Mongolia
By number
By value

0
0

0
0

70
55

0
0

0
0

30
45

Poland
By number

3

14

6

0

23

54

Russia'
By number

0

55

11

0

0

34

Country

Note:

Restitu
tion

Still in
state
Other3 hands

Bold numbers show the dominant method of each country. Data are as of the end
of 1995.
a. Includes transfers to municipalities or social insurance organisations, debt-equity
swaps, and sales through insolvency proceedings.
b. Number of privatised firms as a share of all formerly state-owned firms. Includes parts
of firms restructured prior to privatisation.
c. Includes assets sold for cash as part of the voucher privatisation program through
June 1994.
d. Value of firms privatised as a share of the value of all formerly state-owned firms. Data
for Poland and Russia are unavailable.
e. Does not include some infrastructure firms. All management buyouts were part of
competitive, open tenders. In thirteen cases citizens could exchange vouchers for
minority shares in firms sold to a core investor.
Source: Gray, background paper; World Bank data.
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Privatisation options for medium and large SOEs
A brief elaboration of the potential advantages and
disadvantages of each of the previously identified methods of
privatisation is now conducted.
1. Spontaneous privatisation
This is most likely to occur early on in the transition process,
during the period of time of transfer from Communist government
control to the establishment of a democratically elected
government. During this turbulent period state enterprise
managers can acquire state assets very cheaply by selling the
assets they control to themselves, or simply abscond illegally with
them, usually in collusion with members of the former
nomenclature elite. This occurred extensively in Hungary and
Russia and resulted in widespread resentment about its
unfairness, ultimately leading to its eventual abandonment. There
are major ambiguities over its benefits in terms of better corporate
governance and its feasibility and desirability. It is also unlikely
to improve enterprise access to capital and skills, and because
such enterprises are sold off so cheaply do not generate much
revenue to government. This is an approach to privatisation
which should, overall, be avoided.
2. Sales to outsiders
In the early days of transition most of the Central and Eastern
European countries hoped to privatise by selling state enterprises
as going concerns on a case by case basis, based upon the
experiences of the UK and other middle level income countries
like Chile. Sales to "outside" or "core" investors were also
favoured since they would bring in revenue and turn the firm over
to "real" owners possessing the knowledge and incentives to
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govern the company efficiently, as well as having the necessary
capital to restructure it. Although sales to outside investors have
largely achieved expected performance improvements, they have
proved to be disappointing in that they have been: costly and
slow; more difficult to implement than anticipated; and relatively
few in number. The latter is primarily due to the limited
availability of domestic capital, as well as political concerns
arising from a large dependence on foreign capital. Even where
domestic capital is sufficient, insiders (managers and other
employees) have been able to block sales. More generally, the
process is held back by the sheer enormity of the task of
evaluating and negotiating deals one by one, and then of following
up to be sure that the buyers fulfill contract provisions. For
example, in Germany it is reported that 20% of the thousands of
privatisation contracts signed by the Treuhandanstalt (the
privatisation agency) are in dispute. Other difficulties relate to:
problems with placing a value on firms to be offered for sale;
appraising and assigning responsibility for past environmental
damage; its perceived unfairness. Many ordinary citizens cannot
participate and find the process non transparent and arbitrary if
not corrupt. Among other transition economies, only Hungary and
Estonia have privatised a significant share of their enterprises
through direct sales. In Poland the power of workers to block
privatisation has considerably slowed progress. The conclusion is
that such sales, although a useful element in the privatisation
process, cannot in most circumstances be the sole or even the
primary method.
A second form of sale to outsiders involves floating shares on
public stock exchanges. The infancy of stock exchanges limits this
approach in all the transition economies. Furthermore, the method
works only for firms with good financial prospects and strong
reputations. Even Poland, which has had the most success with
this approach, has privatised fewer than thirty firms in this
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manner. Hungary has had no greater success. Initial public
offerings are clearly not the answer to the need for rapid, large
scale privatisation, although at the margin they can help develop
capital markets and share trading.
3. Management-employee buyouts
Management-employee buyouts are a widely used alternative to
sales, notably in Croatia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. Many of
the firms privatised through Lithuania's and Mongolia's voucher
programs effectively became management-employee buyouts, as
employees and their families used vouchers and cash to buy
major stakes in their own firms. Such buyouts are relatively fast
and easy to implement, both politically and technically. In theory
they could also be better for corporate governance if insiders have
better access to the information needed to monitor managers.
However the risks and disadvantages are many, particularly in
large-scale buyout programs that include many unprofitable firms
in need of restructuring. One disadvantage is that the benefits are
unevenly distributed, since employees in good firms get valuable
assets while those in money losers get little or nothing of value.
Another is that governments typically charge low prices to
insiders and thereby realise little revenue. In addition
management-employee buyouts
may
weaken
corporate
g o v ern an ce, p a rtic u la rly in tra n sitio n eco n o m ies, w h ere co n tro ls

on managers are less developed than in a fully fledged market
economy and product and capital markets cannot be counted
upon to enforce discipline. Insiders are generally unable to bring in
new skills and new capital, yet may deter outsiders who can from
investing. Managers or employees may simply prevent outsiders
from buying shares. Or outsiders may hesitate to invest in firms
with significant insider ownership because of potential conflicts
of interest between inside and outside owners. Management47

employee buyouts can, therefore, lead to managerial and worker
entrenchment that blocks further reform. Russia's mass
privatisation program of 1992-94, although it used vouchers, was
basically a management-employee buyout program because of its
preferential treatment of managers and workers. In the end
insiders acquired about two thirds of the shares in the 15,000
privatised firms. Outsiders obtained 20 to 30% (about 10 to 15%
each went to investment funds and individual investors), and the
rest remained in government hands.
4. Equal Access voucher privatisation
The final form of privatisation to be discussed distributes
vouchers across the population, and attempts to allocate assets
approximately evenly among voucher holders. Such programs
have proven to excel in terms of both speed and fairness. On the
negative side they raise no revenue for government, and have
unclear implications for corporate governance. Mongolia,
Lithuania and the former Czechoslovakia were the first to
implement this form of privatisation. Albania, Armenia,
Kazakstan, Moldova, Poland, Romania (in its 1995 program),
an d Ukraine have fo llo w e d , an d B u lg a ria is n o w p re p a rin g such a
program. Some countries (such as Georgia and Russia) have used
vouchers but given strong preference to insiders. A few countries
(Estonia and Romania in its 1991 program) have used vouchers to
transfer only minority stakes in certain firms. Hungary, FYR
Macedonia and Uzbekistan are among the few privatising
transition economies that have specifically rejected the use of
vouchers.
It is widely accepted that the Czech Republic's mass
privatisation program has been the most successful to date. In
two successive waves (the first while part of Czechoslovakia), the
Czechs transferred more than half the assets of state enterprises
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into private hands. Citizens were free to invest their vouchers
directly in the firms being auctioned. However, to encourage more
concentrated ownership and so create incentives for more active
corporate governance, the program allowed the free entry of
intermediary investment funds to pool vouchers and invest them
on the original holders' behalf. More than two-thirds of voucher
holders chose to place their vouchers with these competing funds.
The ten largest obtained more than 40% of all vouchers in both
waves (about 72% of all vouchers held by such funds), leading to
concentrated ownership of the Czech industrial sector by these
large funds. This is in stark contrast to the experience of
Mongolia, which forbade the entry of intermediary funds and
ended up with heavy inside ownership.
Such intermediary funds are represented on company boards,
and are demanding better financial information and imposing
financial discipline on the firms they own. They trade large blocks
of shares among themselves or sell them to strategic investors. As
a result a moderately active share market has developed on the
Prague stock exchange, but is much larger in the over the counter
system. Clearly, however, patterns of ownership in the Czech
Republic are still in a state of flux. Some observers hope that the
intermediary funds, together with banks or in place of them, will
become the cornerstone of the financial infrastructure, which is
essential for capital allocation and corporate governance in a
market economy. Others expect the funds' influence to dwindle
rapidly as strategic investors pick up controlling blocks of shares.
In either case the longer term goal of institution building is
operating well by this approach to privatisation. Hence the Czech
experience illustrates how a well designed voucher privatisation
program can overcome many problems. It can depoliticise
restructuring, stimulate development of capital markets, and
quickly create new stakeholders with an interest in reform. A
critical determinant of the longer run success of any reform
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program is the extent to which ownership rights can evolve into
more efficient forms. Programs that stimulate the growth of
capital and asset markets, such as the Czech Republic's
privatisation program, have a distinct advantage In addition
Governments need also to implement complementary reforms, for
example regarding the supervision of financial intermediaries and
the regulation of natural monopolies. In this context the voucher
privatisation model is one which could be given serious
consideration by the Chinese authorities, should they wish to take
the next step of privatising many of the large SOEs.
The transition economies' experience with privatising small enterprises
Small firms have proved much easier to privatise than large ones.
Most small firms are engaged in trade and service activities with
simple technology and easy entry. None of the major obstacles to
privatisation of large entities, such as high capital requirements,
major restructuring needs and regulatory and governance
weaknesses, apply to small firms. Local authorities can take
charge of transferring small units and, because they are easier to
value, many parties can gain access to enough information for
open auctions to succeed. Privatised small businesses can serve
as important schools for entrepreneurs and investors, and can
absorb labour being shed from large scale enterprises. The former
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were the first countries to
achieve widespread ownership of small businesses, using very
different approaches. The Czechs implemented a centrally
conceived but locally administered system of open, competitive
auctions. Poland's program, like its large scale privatisation
program, was somewhat ad hoc and gave large concessions to
employees . Hungary had a reasonably sized trade and services
sector even under central planning, with strong, decentralised
managerial control through leasehold. This sector grew less
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through widespread privatisation than through the entry of new
private competitors. Following these leaders, most other
transition economies have carried out substantial small scale
privatisation, and Albania, the Baltic states, Croatia, Russia, and
Slovenia have caught up with the earlier starters in terms of the
percentage of small firms divested.
The lessons of experience from enterprise reform are quite clear
and applicable across the range of transition economies. Firms
surviving from the era of central planning need major restructuring
of their production and reorientation of their incentives. Entities
that face strict financial discipline and competition and have
clear owners are most likely to undertake the needed restructuring
or to exit, leaving room for new and better firms. In the short run
financial discipline can be fostered through stabilisation and
liberalisation measures, but in the longer run decentralised
ownership, preferably private, clearly defined property rights and
supporting institutions are needed to sustain financial discipline,
to respond to market oriented incentives, and to provide
alternative forms of corporate finance and governance. This in
conjunction with the desire for long term institution building
appropriate for a market economy, would suggest that China
could learn a great deal from the equal access voucher approach
to privatisation should, or when, this becomes politically
expedient.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has conducted a review of the more recent
performance of China's SOEs. Despite reforms initiated in the
mid 1970s it became clear after the retrenchment period of 198891 that the performance of the SOEs remained weak, and that
further reform was required. The adoption of the goal of attaining
a socialist market economy by the Communist Party in 1992,
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spurred a renewed phase of SOE reform. Emphasis was to be
given to the corporatisation of SOEs through an intensification of
the shareholding experiment begun in the 1980s, the establishment
of enterprise groups along the lines of Korea's chaebols, and small
and medium sized SOEs were to be sold, leased or in the case of
loss making enterprises allowed to go bankrupt.
The performance of the SOEs has shown further deterioration
over the past few years and this has been intensified by the
implementation of a three year austerity program, implemented
with the objective of reducing inflation and achieving a more
sustainable growth rate. The deteriorating performance of the
large SOEs in 1995 and 1996 led to an expansion of bank loans to
them, which led many economists to question the government's
real commitment to SOE reform. However progress is being made
albeit slowly. Reform has been implemented in areas which have
adversely affected SOE profits, including that of price
liberalisation, greater flexibility in the hiring and firing of workers
and social security reform. The latter reducing the financial
burden which SOEs face in regard to the provision of housing,
health, and pensions, and in addition a more widespread
unemployment insurance scheme. These are essential if further
reform of SOEs are to be implemented, and most crucially that
relating to the need to impose financial discipline and to eliminate
the link between them and the commercial state banking sector.
Unless this is done further reform of the financial sector will be
difficult, including the development of instruments for indirect
macroeconomic control so urgently required in China's emerging
market economy. This will mean job losses in the state sector.
However, the encouraging rapid development of the non state
sector, and in particular the tertiary sector, suggests that some of
the anticipated 18-20 million workers who will lose their jobs in
the state sector over the next five years, will be absorbed by the
dynamic non state sector.
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The experience from other transition economies is that the
imposition of financial discipline, in conjunction with an opening
up of markets and increased competition, is the best way to bring
about an improved performance of SOEs. Decentralisation of
ownership, also seen as essential, has been achieved in most of
the other transition economies through both the privatisation of
SOEs and the entry of new private businesses. In the case of
China, decentralisation of ownership has been occurring primarily
through the expanding significance of the non state sector as well
as limited "privatisation" of large SOEs and the selling off of
small and medium sized SOEs. In China, however, public
ownership of the pillar industries of the economy will remain for
the foreseeable future at least. However reforms in terms of
corporatisation,
the development of
stock
exchanges,
standardisation of accounting practices suggest that a framework
for the future privatisation of large SOEs is being put in place.
A number of privatisation methods adopted in the other
transition economies were outlined. Some of these could be
utilised in the context of China's large SOEs at a future date.
Spontaneous privatisation should be avoided, sales to "core"
investors of large SOEs may be politically possible in China as
long as they were to domestic rather than foreign owners,
management-employee buyouts may be difficult at the large SOE
level but more practical at the medium to small SOE level, while
equal access voucher privatisation may provide the most
appropriate framework of all. The latter would fit well with
China's institution building in terms of the development of strong
financial intermediaries.
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